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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
EXEMPTIONS - PERSONS ENTITLED - HEAD OF FAMILY PARTIALLY EXEMPT IN GARNISHMENT FOR WAGES.-The Exemption
Act' provides that when the debt or judgment on which a suit is
brought is for the wages of any laborer or servant, and the finding is expressed in the record of the judgment and endorsed upon

the execution, no personal exemption shall be allowed. The Garnishment Act 2 provides that the wages or salary for services of

an employee who is head of and residing with his family shall to
the extent of twenty dollars per week be exempt from any garnishment.
The problem of which claim is superior to the other when the

application of facts would result in a conflict was presented in
1 II1. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 52, par. 16, reads: "No personal property shall be exempted from levy of attachment or execution when the debt or
judgment is for the wages of any laborer or servant: provided, the court
rendering judgment shall find that the demand so sued for is for wages due
such person as laborer or servant; which finding shall be expressed in the
record of said judgment and endorsed upon the execution when issued."
2 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 62, par. 14, reads in part: "The wages
or salary for services of an employee who is the head of a family and residing
with the same to the amount of twenty dollars per week, shall be exempt from
garnishment ....
All above said exempt amount shall be liable to garnishment."
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the case of Markus v. Hart,Schaffner and Marx.3 George Guditus
had worked as laborer on Markus' farm and had recovered a
judgment for wages against Markus. Upon return of the execution nulla bona, garnishment proceedings were commenced
against the Hart, Schaffner and Marx Company, by whom Markus
was employed. The garnishee answered that it was indebted to
Markus for the sum of $22.15 for wages, but that the amount was
claimed as an exemption under section 14 of the Garnishment
Act.
The lower court found that the exemption in favor of Markus
under the Garnishment Act was paramount to that provision
of the Exemption Act which provides that no exemption should
be allowed where the judgment debt was for wages of a laborer
or servant. This decision discharging the garnishee was affirmed
by the Appellate Court. Thus, it is decided that the exemption
from garnishment in favor of the head of a family is secure even
against a claim for wages by his servant or laborer.
C. E. HACKLANDER
STATUTE OF FRAUDS--PROMISE TO ANSWER FOR DEBT OF ANOTHER--INDORSEMENT ON NON-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT AS SUF-

interesting situation was recently
presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the
case of Gloucester Mutual Fishing Insurance Company v. Boyer
et al.1 The undertaking sued on was an instrument made by a
fishing firm and given for insurance. On the back was written,
"Waiving demand and notice," followed by the same date as on
the face of the instrument, and then the signatures of the defendants. After the defendants had disposed of all their interest in
the maker company, and it was clearly insolvent, suit was
brought on the instrument to recover premiums and assessments
owed. The trial judge ruled that the evidence indicated no liability by these defendants, but the upper court sustained the
plaintiff's exceptions.
The instrument was clearly not negotiable because of the uncertainty of time and the sum payable, so the Negotiable Instrument Law was not applicable. For the same reasons this writing
was not even a non-negotiable promissory note, on which defendants could be liable as anomalous parties. Furthermore, the
facts that the back of the instrument was separately dated and
bore the words "waiving demand and notice" above the signatures indicated that defendants had no intention of joining in the
FICIENT MEMORANDUM.-An

3 284 III. App. 166 (1936).
1 200 N. E. 557 (Mass., 1936).
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promise expressed on the face. However, before it could be concluded that the writing on the back was a nullity the court said
it must apply the construction principle that effect must be
given, if possible, to every word of an instrument and every signature thereon. The only alternatives were that it was an assignment of defendants' rights or that they thereby guaranteed the
performance of the promise expressed on the face. The former
was excluded because defendants had nothing to assign, and the
words of waiver preceding their signatures showed an intent to
assume some liability. It was objected that if it was a guaranty,
then the statute of frauds disposed of that. The court conceded
that it was within the statute, but asserted that a signature may
be a sufficient writing to indicate the guaranty. These signatures
were meaningless unless expressive of such intent. If it was a
guaranty, then, the payee had authority to write in the contract
implied by law. Actually to insert such words of guaranty above
the signature the court thought would be an unnecessary concession to form. Although the consideration for such an undertaking must be alleged and proved, by statute in Massachusetts
as in Illinois, it is not necessary that it be shown by writing. So
it was error to hold that plaintiff had established no grounds of
liability. The court cited an early Illinois case, Underwood v.
Hossack,2 one of the few cases on this question; which arrived
at the same conclusion as to an indorsement on a non-negotiable
warehouse receipt, and seems to be the only decision in this state
on the question.
While at first glance it might seem that the court is approving
as a memorandum a writing which contains no promise, it must
be remembered that the contents of a memorandum will sometimes more clearly, sometimes less clearly, convey the idea of the
writer. What is essential is that no ambiguity remain when the
sense of the words is extracted from them. While there are fewer
words here than might be desirable, one idea only is conveyed by
them-that the defendants guaranteed the obligation on the
reverse side of the paper.
J. M. HADSAU
VENDOR AND

PURCHASER -

VALIDITY

OF CONTRACT -

PUR-

CHASER'S RIGHT TO RESCIND FOR FRAUD OF AGENT.-Despite

the

stipulations in a written contract that all representations affecting the contract were expressed therein, that the seller's salesman had no authority to modify the contract in any manner,
2 38 II. 208 (1865).
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and that the buyer knew the contents of the contract and had
examined the location of the property and found it to be as
shown on the diagram of the contract, the Appellate Court of
Illinois in Klee v. Chicago Title and Trust Company' held that
the fraudulent misrepresentations of the agent furnished sufficient grounds for rescission of the contract.
Harry Schwartz, by one Malnick, his salesman, agreed in writing to sell the plaintiff a tract of land in Gary, Indiana. The
salesman made extravagant statements concerning the prospective value of the land, but the actual representations of existing
facts were that the land was located at the intersection of two
section lines-Clinton Street and Fifth Avenue; that Fifth Avenue was a boulevard with an electric line, zoned for business.
When the written contract was presented for signature, the
plaintiff called Malnick's attention to the fact that the contract
did not contain a statement that the two streets mentioned were
section lines nor that Fifth Avenue was a boulevard nor electric
line. Thereupon Malnick wrote those terms into the plaintiff's
copy of the contract, but not on Schwartz's copy. Five years
after signing the contract, and after he had paid a substantial
amount toward the purchase price, the plaintiff learned from his
uncle, who resided five miles from Gary that neither Fifth
Avenue nor Clinton Street was a section line. Plaintiff then went
to Gary and learned that the other representations enumerated
were false. Thereafter he brought suit for rescission. Presumably, although it was not stated, the contract was made in
Chicago.
The Appellate Court decided that the plaintiff was not estopped
by the contract to assert that a fraud had been practiced upon
him and that the plaintiff was not barred by laches as there was
no unreasonable delay after discovery of the fraud. The court
said the facts were (no evidence was recited to support this fact)
that the plaintiff was not familiar with the location or value of
the lots; that he was busy working and relied on defendant's
representations.
If this case is given the strongest construction possible, the
decision must be explained on the grounds that the plaintiff had
a right to rely on the agent's representations and that the defendant was bound as he received and accepted a benefit acquired
by the tort of his agent.2 Where, however, the latter question is
1 284 Ill. App. 112 (1936).
2 Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180 (1870) ; Woodward v. Webb, 65 Pa. St.
254 (1870).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

involved, the vendee must prove that the vendor, after knowledge
of such representations of his agent and an offer of rescission on
those grounds, refused to accept the rescission.3
Although the facts are not disclosed, the plaintiff here probably offered to place the defendant in statu quo; therefore, we
must consider that this case decides that a vendee who rightfully
relies on fraudulent representations of the vendor's agent may
rescind the contract despite a provision in the contract that all
stipulations affecting it were expressed therein. Whether this
conclusion is correct here depends upon the right of the plaintiff
to rely on the statement of the agent, Malnick.
It does not appear that the plaintiff had any right whatever
so to rely. The Illinois Appellate Court has repeatedly determined 4 that a vendee cannot show evidence of an oral agreement
affecting a written instrument, when the contract states that all
agreements of the parties are covered therein and cannot be
varied by a verbal contract. These decisions were decided on the
theory that when a third party has notice of the principal's
instructions as to the limitations imposed on his agent, the principal should not be bound by an act of the agent beyond such
5
authority.
In a recent New York case6 the plaintiff had signed a printed
contract for the purchase of twenty tons of coloring material
sold by the defendant. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff instituted
an action to rescind the contract on the ground that the plaintiff
had been induced to enter it by fraudulent representations of the
sales agent of the defendant. The contract contained a statement
that "the company makes no representation regarding previous
sales in the distributor's territory"; also a statement that "no
representation or warranty of any kind shall be binding upon
either the Duralith Corporation [defendant] or the dealer unless
it has been incorporated in this agreement."
The plaintiff maintained that a person could not exempt himself from liability for fraud by inserting in his contract a blanket
clause protecting him from such liability. The court, however,
Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 P. 969 (1928).
McCaskey Co. v. Little, 253 Ill. App. 431 (1929) ; Ziehme v. McInerney,
167 Ill. App. 577 (1912). But see Plate v. Detroit Fidelity Co., 229 Mich.
3

4

489, 201 N. W. 459 (1924).

5 Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 83 Ill. 302 (1876) ; Lycoming Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 90 Ill. 545 (1878) ; Maxcey v. Heckethorn, 44 Ill. 437 (1867);
Leathers v. Springfield, 65 Mo. 504 (1877) ; Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill (N. Y.)

279 (1842).
6 Ernst Iron Works v. Duralith Corp., 200 N. E. 683 (N. Y., 1936).
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decided the case on the ground that a principal is not liable
for loss caused to another by reason of his reliance upon a deceitful representation of an agent, unless the representation was
authorized or apparently authorized. "If a third person has
notice of a limitation of an agent's authority, he cannot subject
the principal to liability upon a transaction with the agent in
violation of such limitation." The court decided that the plaintiff could not rescind the contract.
Assuming, however, that this feature of the plaintiff's case
is not conclusive, although it would appear to be so, the court
would then be confronted with the problem of the vendee's right
to rely on the seller's representations where the sale is made of
property at such a distance that the vendee has not the means of
ascertaining the truthfulness of the representation made to him
by the purchaser. Where the distance is sufficient such a proposition is well supported by authority. 7 But in Wightman v. Tucker8
the Appellate Court decided that the rule does not apply where
the representation was made in Chicago concerning merchandise
in Keokuk, Iowa, which was about twelve hours by rail from Chicago with three trains daily, and the plaintiff could not recover
as he, the purchaser, should have used due diligence. In Mosier
v. Osborn,9 however, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the
plaintiff to rely on the seller where the land was in McDonough
County, Illinois, and the representation was made in Chanute,
Kansas. The latter distance was about one-half again as far as
that in the Wightman case.
The question in any such case, however, is whether the distance is enough to justify the plaintiff in not making a personal
inspection. Gary is about one hour's ride by electric train from
Chicago and there is a train every hour. Also the plaintiff
had a relative who resided near Gary who might have inspected
the property for him.
On previously recognized principles therefore, this case cannot be sustained and a majority of the evidence allowed is irrelevent. On the contrary, there was no evidence that the seller
knew of the agent's representations until six years after the contract was signed, so there is no possible ratification by the vendor.
In conclusion we can say that the court has actually decided
7 Mosier v. Osborn, 284 11. 141, 119 N. E. 924 (1918) ; Ladd v. Pigott, 114
Il1. 647, 2 N. E. 503 (1885) ; Wightman v. Tucker, 50 Ill. App. 75 (1892) ;
Harris v. McMurray, 23 Ind. 9 (1864); Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26
(1839) ; Savage v. Stevens, 126 Mass. 207 (1879).
8 50 Ill. App. 75 (1892).
9 284 I1. 141, 119 N. E. 924 (1918).
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this case, not on the grounds enumerated by the court, but on
the theory that there was a fiduciary relation between the laborer
purchaser and the seller's agent. The court did not consider
the notice to the plaintiff of the seller's limited authority.
If the court's decision is accepted at face value it must be
that a vendee may rely on the seller's representations in Chicago
as to the location and value of land in Gary, Indiana. Whether
this is a valid extension of the distant land doctrine is open to
doubt.
J. L. PORTER
PROCESS -

DEFECTS IN SERVICE

-

WHEN ISSUANCE OF ALIAS

WRIT BY ORDER OF COURT IS IMPROPER.-In the recent case of
First National Bank of Chicago v. Donnersberger,' the Illinois
Appellate Court held that the last sentence of Rule 5 (1) of the
Supreme Court, providing that "The court may order the issuance of alias writs" does not change the old practice relating
to the issuance of alias summonses by order of court, and that
therefore, while an original valid summons was still outstanding
no valid alias could be issued, and it was proper for the trial
court on motion of the party served, to quash the summons issued
under the order of court.
In this case, which originated as a bill to foreclose, the original
summons was returned "not found" as to the defendant Belle
Brigham. On January 19, 1934, an alias was issued against this
"not found" on February 19.
- hi.' c..,1wsrtre
d - L, wiii-i
def-e ianL,
,3

.0

On January 27, while the original alias was still outstanding,
the plaintiff learned that the defendant was in Highland Park,
and was about to leave the jurisdiction. Thereupon he obtained
an order of court authorizing an individual to serve process on
the defendant, and a summons issued, which was returned February 2 as personally served. Upon motion by the defendant,
the trial court quashed this second alias, and the Appellate
Court, in its decision, affirmed the order of the trial court.
It seems that a practical solution of the difficulty in a case
such as this, where it is determined that immediate service of a
summons is necessary, and the original alias is still outstanding,
would be found in one of the following alternatives: first, obtain
the original alias from the deputy into whose hands it has been
placed and then have an individual appointed by the court to
serve it on the defendant; second, request the deputy to go into
the adjoining county to make service on the defendant; third,
1 283 Ill. App. 517 (1936).
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request the deputy to return the original "not found" and then
take out a new alias directed to an officer of the county wherein
the defendant can be found, or else have an individual authorized
to serve the new alias; or fourth, have another deputy or an
individual authorized by the court serve a copy of the original
alias and make his return on the original.
M. H. TUTTLE
APPEAL AND ERROR-STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AND REMEDIES--

EFFECT OF STATUTORY PROVISION FOR NULLIFICATION OF APPEAL
IF APPELLATE COURT FAILS TO RENDER DECISION WITHIN NINETY

DAYS.-In a statute setting up a milk control board, the provision
whereby the final judgment or decree of the circuit or superior
court should be conclusively deemed to be affirmed unless, upon
proper appeal to it, the appellate court render its decision within
90 days, was held, in Albert v. Milk Control Board of Indiana,'
2
to be void as creating an arbitrary and capricious classification.
The statute provided in part for appeal to the circuit or superior court from the orders of the control board, and it went on to
give the litigants the right of appeal to the Appellate Court of
Indiana under the rules governing such appeals in civil cases.
But it included a proviso that if that court should fail to render
its decision within 90 days after the transcript of the record
therein was filed with it, the judgment or decree so appealed
from should be conclusively deemed to be affirmed.
"Under the foregoing section," the Indiana court said, referring to the aforementioned provision of the act, "an appeal
having been provided for in certain cases to the Appellate Court,
we do not think the Legislature had the power to, in effect,
compel the court to decide the case within 90 days. There must
be an orderly procedure in the disposition of appealed cases, and
to say that one class of cases must be decided within a specified
time, and by failure to do so the judgment below must be considered affirmed, is an arbitrary and capricious classification. The
act gives a right to appeal, and, after one appeals and incurs
the expense thereof, he should not be deprived of the right to
have his appeal disposed of in the regular manner because of
the failure of the court, for one reason or another, to decide it
within 90 days."
Precedent for the decision is to be found in Schario v. State,8
1 200 N. E. 688 (Ind., 1936).
2 The other provisions of the statute were upheld as valid and effective.

3 105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N. E. 63 (1922).
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involving a similar legislative provision. Here an act of the Ohio
General Assembly read in part as follows: "Such petition in
error must be filed within thirty days after the judgment complained of, and the case shall be heard by such reviewing court
within not more than thirty court days after filing such petition
in error." The court cited the requirement that the reviewing
court determine the cause within 30 court days as "an unreasonable and unconstitutional invasion of judicial power."
It may be said, in general, in the words of the court in The
Freeport Motor Casualty Company v. Madden,4 that in purely
statutory proceedings in which the jurisdiction of the court is
not exercised according to the course of the common law, there
can be no review of the judgment of an inferior court unless it
is specifically provided for by statute, and then the review must
be had in the manner prescribed. 5 In effect, if the legislature
gives a remedy of appeal, it may also take it away. But to limit
the remedy of appeal in a way that results in imposing a restriction upon the internal government of the court is objectionable
under the traditional tripartite form of government. For the
legislature to declare what shall be conclusive evidence would be
an invasion of the power of the judiciary, 6 as also would an
attempt to dictate the requirements for practice before the
courts, 7 to cite but two of the many matters germane to the
judiciary. The Milk Control Board decision is in harmony with
this fundamental separation of powers.
H. MACDONALD
INSURANCE-DESCRIPTION OF TITLE-TITLE IN JOINT TENANCY
AS VIOLATING WARRANTY THAT INSURED'S INTEREST IS UNCONDI-

TIONAL AND SoLE.-That Illinois has adopted the rule of strict

construction of insurance contracts is indicated by the recent
4 354 Ill. 486, 188 N. E. 415 (1933).
5 To the same effect, see People v. McGoorty, 270 Ill. 610, 110 N. E. 791
(1915) ; Hall v. First Nat. Bk. of Pittsfield, 330 Ill. 234, 161 N. E. 311
(1928); People v. Hahlo, 228 N. Y. 309, 127 N. E. 402 (1920), affirmed in
Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 42 S. Ct. 214, 66 L. Ed. 514 (1922) ; Bake v.
Smiley, 84 Ind. 212 (1882) ; City of Indianapolis v. L. C. Thompson Mfg.
Co., 40 Ind. App. 535, 81 N. E. 1156 (1907), rehearing denied, 40 Ind. App.

535, 82 N. E. 540 (1907).
For legislative limitations upon matters upon which the court of last
resort may pass, see Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 326, 38 N.
E. 784 (1894); Sinopoli v. Chicago Rys. Co., 316 11. 609, 147 N. E. 487
(1925) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 318 Ill. 402, 149 N. E. 422

(1925).

6 People v. Rose, 207 Ill. 352, 69 N. E. 762 (1904).
7 In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932).
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decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pollock v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company of Hartford.' In this case, M. D.
Pollock and his wife owned in joint tenancy certain property,
improved by a dwelling house, in which they lived, and occupied
as a homestead. In 1927, Pollock obtained a policy of insurance
from the defendant, covering among other hazards loss or damage by lightning. In 1930, a renewal of this policy for an extended term was issued by the company and was mailed to and
accepted by Pollock. A loss occurred within the policy, suit was
started, and a verdict of $1140.77 given to the plaintiff, but on
motion of the defendant, it was given a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was upheld by the Appellate Court.
Liability under the policy was denied under a clause of the
policy which read: "This entire policy unless otherwise provided by agreement endorsed hereon or added hereto shall be
void . .. if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership; or if the subject of insurance be a
building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple.
This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or
misrepresented in writing or otherwise any material fact or
circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof;
or if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly
stated herein." The fact that the property was held in joint
tenancy was deemed by the court to have violated this condition
and no recovery was allowed.
Apparently no case has arisen in the reviewing courts of
Illinois involving construction of a policy with a stipulation such
as this where the conditions of title and the attending circumstances of delivery are as here, and but few involving even closely
similar situations in the country at large; so the decision is the
more significant, particularly in view of the increasingly liberal
attitude, not only of the Illinois courts, but of court generally.
In the Illinois Supreme Court case of Fray v. National Fire
Insurance Company,2 it was held that although the title was held
as trustee, it was not objectionable to the clause that the interest
must be "unconditional and sole." In that opinion other Illinois
cases were cited wherein a title as life tenant and as trustee
under a will, and the title of vendors with an executory contract
outstanding were not offensive to the clause in question. Several
other Illinois cases were distinguished from the instant case.
1 362 Ill. 313, 199 N. E. 816 (1936).
341 IMI.431, 173 N. E. 479 (1930).

2
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In Capps v. National Union Fire Insurance Company3 recovery
was denied to a vendee who was in possession of the property
under a contract to purchase, on which several payments had
been made, but with no other title. The court adopted the rule
of the Capps case as controlling the question in the instant case.
It may be noted, however, that in the Capps case the insured
had neither legal nor the entire equitable title, a fact which the
court itself recognized and considered of importance. When considered from the standpoint of the materiality of the risk, arguments sustaining it and the other cases cited therein would not
apply with equal logic to the facts in the main case. If the court
had been disposed to adopt the liberal view, it could have used
the argument suggested by the plaintiff that a title of joint
tenancy with its characteristics-unity of time, title, interest, and
4
possession-comes within the definition quoted in a Federal case
reviewed by the court: "To be unconditional and sole, the interest must be vested in the insured not contingent or conditional
nor for years or life, nor in common, but of such a nature that
the insured must sustain the entire loss if the property is
destroyed."
Analysis discloses that there is a division of authority between
those cases which contain the clause that the ownership must be
"unconditional and sole" and those which contain the additional stipulation that the policy is void "if the interest of the
insured in the property be not truly stated." In both series of
cases the courts usually find offensive to the conditions mentioned
titles of life tenancy, tenancy for years, or tenancy in common,
or facts showing that there is a sale under execution of judgment,
that a mortgage is outstanding, that the party is buying under
contract, or that information has been given by the assured at
variance with the facts either in a written application or orally
or otherwise upon inquiry by the insurer. It may be observed
that in the usual definition of "sole and unconditional" most
of the estates just mentioned are specifically excluded, while no
mention of specific exclusion is made of that of joint tenancy. In
the case where incorrect information is given, there may be
8 318 Ill.
350, 149 N. E. 247 (1925).
4 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 162 F. 447 (1908), which denied
recovery under a similar clause, where the interest of the insured was that of
purchaser at a sale under a mortgage foreclosure, quoting the definition from
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Keating, 86 Md. 130, 38 A. 29 (1897). A similar
definition is given in George A. Clement, The Law of Fire Insurance (New
York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1905), II, 152, and in Elliot on Insurance,
p. 242.
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actual fraud, and in the other instances mentioned there is more
likelihood of it than would be the case where, in order to save
the costs of administering an estate, husband and wife take
title in joint tenancy.
The argument for a liberal construction in situations like the
present one is well presented by Vance. 5 Referring specifically to
the problem herein considered, he says, "An interesting and
difficult issue is presented in the case not infrequently arising
when a policy issued on oral application is intended by both
parties to cover the risk of the applicant, but fails to do so
because not adequately worded for that purpose."
After referring to the strict contract rule, he goes on: "But the growing
dissent from this harsh doctrine has come to outweigh its support, and in a majority of the American states the insurer is
held liable. This decision is based on the theory that the insurer
is estopped to deny the soundness of the policy that he has sold
for a sound price, though the process is often called waiver. It
would seem to be the clear duty of the insurer professing to draw
an instrument protecting the applicant's property against certain defined perils to exercise due diligence to supply a policy
which will effect the purpose intended. Any damage caused to
the applicant through the agent's mistakes or negligence in making inquiries that he should know to be pertinent should rest on
the insurer. The situation seems to be strikingly analogous to
that expressed in the familiar rule of the law of sales, to the
effect that a vendor supplying an article which he knows is to be
used for a specific purpose, impliedly warrants that the article
furnished is suitable for that purpose." 7 Therefore, while the
decision, considered from the standpoint of upholding the validity of a stipulation in a policy such as here mentioned, has the
support of numerous text writers and of many decisions, the
application of the doctrine to facts such as here presented seems
to have gone the length in applying the rigid rule. 8
C. E.

HACKLANDER

5 William R. Vance, Handbook of the Law and Insurance (2d ed.,
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1930), secs. 71 and 71 (d), pp.
214-215.
6 Ibid., p. 525.
7 Ibid., p. 526, note 21, referring to the statement cited, lists numerous
cases. The theory is set forth in 30 Yale L. J. 203, "The Application to
Insurance Contracts of the Implied Warranty of Sales Law."
s For cases involving the problem, see the following:
Those denying recovery: Schroedel v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., 158 Pa. St.
459, 27 A. 1077 (1893) ; Porobenski v. American Alliance Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-WRONGFUL

ACTS OF AGENT-EXTEN-

SION OF AGENT'S IMMUNITY TO PRINCIPAL IN RESPONDEAT SUPE-

RIOR.-The case of Miller v. J. A. Tyrholm & Company, Incorporated,1 which the Supreme Court of Minnesota has just handed
down, indicates the great disparity between neighboring states as
to certain principles of agency, and furnishes additional evidence
that the law on that subject continues to be in a state of transition. The decision holds that a wife, who was injured by her
husband's negligence while, with the dealer's consent, he was
driving an automobile which he contemplated purchasing, may
recover her damages from the dealer when contributory negligence is not established. This holding is based first, on the
ground that this situation establishes an agency relation, and
second, on the conclusion that a principal cannot share in his
agent's immunity from suits brought by the agent's wife.
The first basis upon which the recovery was allowed is the
provision of the Minnesota statute that "whenever any motor
vehicle, after this act becomes effective, shall be operated upon
any public street or highway of this State, by any person other
than the owner, with the consent of the owner express or implied,
the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the
agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation
thereof. '"2 It should be noted at the outset that the Illinois
courts would arrive at a contrary conclusion on this point, 8
as there is no such statutory provision in this state.
The question as to the effect of the personal immunity of the
operator of the car is more involved and is one on which there
is much conflict of authority. The defendant here claimed that
unless the agent or servant is liable, the principal or master cannot be held. The Minnesota court answered that argument by
saying that many things might occur which would prevent the
317 Pa. 410, 176 A. 205 (1935) ;Western Assurance Co. v. White, 171 Ark.
733, 286 S. W. 804 (1926); Palma et ux. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of
Hartford et al., 270 N. Y. S. 503 (1934).
Those allowing recovery: Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. (2d) 675
(1929) ; Monpleasure et al. v. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y., 214 Mo. App. 530,
259 S. W. 815 (1924); Turner v. Home Ins. Co., 195 Mo. App. 138, 189
S. W. 626 (1916) ; Wilson et al. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd.,
90 Vt. 105, 96 A. 540 (1916) ; Valenti v. Imperial Assur. Co., 176 A. 413
(Vt., 1935) ; Livingstone v. Boston Ins. Co., 255 Pa. 1, 99 A. 212 (1916)
Lilleback et al. v. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 162 So. 866 (Fla., 1935)
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Nickell et al., 178 Ky. 1, 198 S. W. 534 (1917).
1 265 N. W. 324 (Minn., 1936).
2 3 Mason's Minn. St., 1934 Supp., sec. 2720-104.
8 Mosby v. Kimball, 345 Ill.
420, 178 N. E. 66 (1931) ; Cook v. Connelly
Chevrolet Co., 261 Ill.
App. 242 (1931).
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enforcement of liability against the agent which should not
relieve his principal. For example, the agent might die before
the cause is heard, he might be financially irresponsible or go
through bankruptcy, or he might even receive from the injured
party a covenant not to sue. The court placed strongest reliance
upon the New York case of Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Company,4 in which the plaintiff, while standing in a highway, was
struck by defendant's car being driven by her husband. That
court said that where an employer commits an unjustified trespass by the hand of a servant, he is brought under a distinct
and independent liability, one which is entirely his own. When
the plaintiff's husband is the moving cause, it does not cease to
be an unlawful act. The fact that the master, if not personally
at fault, has a remedy over against the husband was held to be
irrelevant to this issue. The court also relied on Chase v. New
Haven Waste Material Corporation,5 a Connecticut case, which
allowed a minor child to recover for his father's negligence, who
was defendant's truck driver. That decision stated that there
is no rule of law or public policy which would exempt the
employer in such a case. "The recovery for the wrong done the
wife or child by the employer does not belong to the husband or
father, but to the wife or child." Support for the doctrine of
this case was also found in comparatively recent decisions from
Vermont,6 West Virginia 7 and Mississippi. 8
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire broke through the
uniform rule in allowing a child, employed by his father, to
recover from the one who insured him against injuries to his
workmen in Dunlap v. Dunlap.9 That decision repudiated the
theory that a parent was under an absolute immunity from suit
by his child, for torts, and moreover found that the child in
question was emancipated so that he could sue his father. The
liability of the third party insurance company was then taken for
granted.
These cases all recognize that there are authorities for the contrary doctrine. The following language from one case 10 is often
quoted in a more or less deprecating way as being the sole ground
4

249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928).

5 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930).

6 Poulin v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 A. 698 (1929).
7 Smith v. Smith, 179 S. E. 812 (W. Va., 1935).
8 McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933).
9 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
10 Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W.
297 (1927).
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for it: "If recovery may be had by the wife against the employer, and he in turn may recover from the husband-employee,
then the family wealth remains the same save as diminished by
the expenses of the litigation." This argument obviously disregards the fact that the wife's property is now separate from
that of her husband, and would not, in the eyes of the law, be
diminished by the employer's recovery over. The Illinois Supreme
Court, moreover, has held" that the liability of a master to third
persons for injuries inflicted by the negligence of his servant
acting within the line of his duty is independent of any liability
of the servant to the master.
The Iowa case of Maine v. James Maine & Sons Company'2 is
probably the leading one supporting the opposite conclusion.
The court said, "Unless the servant is liable, there can be no
liability on the part of the master." When the only negligence
is that of the servant, the employer is not a joint wrongdoer, as
he did nothing, except through his employee. When both have
been sued together, many cases have held that a verdict against
the employer alone may not stand. There was a similar statute
in force here, and the court said that it created no liability independent of the negligence of the operator of the car. There
appeared to the court to be even less reason for giving a wife this
right of action than one against a joint tort-feasor with her
husband.
That doctrine was approved and followed by the Illinois Appellate Court in Meece v. Holland Furnace Company13 which
appears to be the only Illinois case on the subject. The defendant's salesman backed its automobile over his own minor son,
and recovery was denied the latter. The court was of opinion
that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot include a case
where the agent, who is the only actor, is not guilty of the offense
charged. The immunity involved is not merely a lack of remedy,
that is, only an incident to the family relationship, but is conceived as an integral part of the distinct unity which the family
is in contemplation of law. The court distinguished the Schubert
case as resting on the broader language of the New York statute
as to married women. This seems erroneous because the New
York courts have refused to construe it as entitling a woman to
sue her husband for an injury to her person or character. The
court, however, in its conclusion suggests as an additional reason
11 Star Brewery Co. v. Hauck, Admx., 222 Ill. 348, 78 N. E. 827 (1906).
12 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20 (1924).
13 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933).
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for its stand, the probability of extended fraud by allowing such
actions. The decision loses strength from the fact that after
determining this question, the court decides that the father was
not driving within the scope of defendant's employment at the
time anyway.
The courts in these cases incline to select the precedents that
appear most appropriate to justice when the problem first arises.
Having made that choice, they must either follow it unswervingly
in the future or expressly overrule it, as the arguments are incapable of compromise. Either the employer's liability is derivative, or it is not. It is submitted that no parallel should be drawn
between an agent's negligence and his directed malfeasance, and
also that the employer should not be identified with the insurer
who agrees expressly to indemnify against such damages. The
present case is undoubtedly indicative of a modern tendency,
underlying which is the liberal theory that industry, personified
by the employer, is better able to withstand the uncertain
burden of accidents resulting from every phase of business than
are individuals. That inclination can probably be counted on to
carry more weight than the warning, expressed by the Illinois
Appellate Court, that to apply the doctrine of respondeat
superior would be to open the door to incalculable fraud.
J. M. HADSALL
LIBEL AND SLANDER -

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS -

PLAIN-

TIFF'S PRIOR LIBEL OF ANOTHER HELD DEFENSE TO LIBEL ACTION.

-That a newspaper which prints a libelous interview may turn
around and print a reply, wherein the person attacked defames
his attacker, without civil liability on the part of the newspaper
for the counter-attack, was the unexpected holding of the Oregon
Supreme Court in the recent case of Israel v. Portland News
Publishing Company,1 It was found that the defamation sued
upon was published by the defendant at the request of the person
originally libeled, that the request was made in self-defense, in
good faith, without malice, and was as a matter of law privileged, and that the newspaper came within the limits of the
privilege.
The facts were that one Akin, a public accountant investigating the fiscal affairs of the Port of Portland, Oregon, had been
found shot. The next day, as part of the investigation of the
murder, a police officer and a reporter of the defendants news1

53 P. (2d) 529 (Ore., 1936).
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paper interviewed Israel, the plaintiff, a jeweler and loan broker.
This interview contained charges of Akin's misconduct with a
woman, and was printed under large headlines in the paper's
next first edition. As soon as the paper was on the streets, a
reporter on the same staff telephoned Akin's widow for her
reaction to the story. The widow denied the truth of Israel's
statement and sought to impeach his credibility by stating that
he was stealing from his father-in-law, that Akin had discovered
this in inspecting his accounts, and that Israel had hated Akin
ever since the discovery. The newspaper carried this interview
with full details in a signed story appearing in the second edition
of the same day's paper.
Israel sued the publisher of the newspaper, alleging defamatory matter published wilfully, maliciously, falsely, and without
just cause or excuse, and the publisher pleaded first, that the
article was communicated by the widow in defense of her husband's good name as well as her own, and was published in good
faith, and second, that the allegations objected to were generally
accepted as true among the plaintiff's acquaintances. The court
instructed the jury that as a matter of law the communication
was privileged, and the plaintiff excepted. Verdict and judgment
were for the defendant, and on appeal the judgment was upheld.
Without considering the ethical standards of the defendant's
newspaper, marking a new low in journalism, which the court
apparently finds unobjectionable, the legal basis for the opinion
appears to strain the usual interpretation of decisions dealing
with privilege in libel and slander. "The law seems to be wellsettled," the court holds, "that when one is attacked by defamatory matter published in the press, one may resort to the same
methods to reply to or rebut the charges made." Quoting Newell
on Libel and Slander,2 the court continues, " 'Every man has a
right to defend his character against false aspersion. It is one
of the duties which he owes to himself and to his family. Therefore, communications made in fair self-defense are privileged. ...
A man who commences a newspaper war cannot subsequently
come to the court as plaintiff to complain that he has had the
worst of the fray. . . .' " But in his discussion of the subject,
Newell sets out a limit for the retaliation; it must be fairly an
answer to the attack. The protection of privilege offered to a
fair reply would not appear to cover the extreme of going entirely outside of the subject matter of the first attack and
2

(4th ed., 1924) p. 456, sec. 429.
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attempting to demolish the last vestige of good repute of the
person making the original libel. The plea of privilege in a newspaper war where the defendant had made such a counter-attack
was held bad in Illinois in the case of Danville Press Company v.
8
Harrison.
In this latter case, a further defense which could
have been applied equally well in the Israel case was that the
defendant acted in the heat of anger, but the court followed previous decisions 4 and ruled that privilege did not arise from such
circumstances.
From another aspect, the Israel case is exceptional, that is,
when it finds on the authority of Preston v. Hobbs5 that the
privilege found to exist for the benefit of the widow runs also for
the benefit of the newspaper. In the Preston case the court is
confronted with a publisher who has taken no active part in
soliciting a libel and has been a mere conduit through which the
counter-attack passed. "Where one is the subject of a libel,"
the court there said, "having himself the right to make a reply,
he may disseminate such reply in, or by means of some appropriate medium, and the one through whom such dissemination is
effected is protected by the same privilege as that which protects
the author." It appears unlikely that such immunity was meant
for a publishing company which was a party to the original
libel, which published it for profit to itself without attempting
first to ascertain the truth, and which then solicited and published a counter-attack, likewise for profit to itself, with no
interest in righting a wrong and every interest in the continuation of the libels.
H.

MACDONALD

3 99 Ill. App. 244 (1901). See also Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 176 N. Y. S.

89 (1919), and Ritschy v. Garrels, 195 Mo. App. 670, 187 S. W. 1120 (1916).
4 Hosley v. Brooks, 20 Il.
116 (1858); Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485
(1873) ; Miller v. Johnson, 79 I1. 58 (1875).
5 146 N. Y. S. 419 (1914).

